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INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
AND THE KURDS*
DR. AMIR A. MAJID··

I.

INTRODUCTION

This article analyses the Kurdish rebellion for autonomy,
the actions of the Iraqi forces against them and the measures
taken by the United Nations, the United States and other
Coalition States to protect the Kurds in the aftermath of the
January/February 1991 Gulf War. The international actions
will be assessed in light of the present rules of International
Law and, in particular, whether they contravene any provision
of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide. 1
Before the commencement of Operation Desert Storm on
January 17, 1991, and during this operation, various American, British, French, Kuwaiti, Saudi, Egyptian, Turkish and
other leaders and politicians, as well as many Western world
affairs commentators, looked towards the Iraqi people to remove Saddam Hussein and establish a fairer government in
their country. Some of these leaders, mainly from the U.S. and

*
**

Edited by Daniel Alweiss.
Senior Lecturer (International Law), London Guildhall University. The
author expresses his wann gratitude to Mr. Richard Pitt, the University Law
Librarian, whose generous research support made possible the completion of this
article. He is also obliged to the Editors of SOCIALIST LAWYER, London, for allowing him to consolidate here some of the ideas expressed in his article Kurds - No
Safe Haven in International Law, SOCIALIST LAWYER, 14, 17 (June 1991).
1. 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1951) (hereinafter 1948 Genocide Convention).
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Israel, directly advocated the forcible overthrow of the Saddam
Regime. Others outlined the misery of and devastation to Iraq
brought about by his regime and, believing that it was for
Iraqis to decide what kind of government they wished to have,
expressed the hope that the Iraqi population would see its selfenlightened interest in ousting President Saddam Hussein and
his confederates. 2
On February 27, U.S. President George Bush announced
the informal cease fire, effective midnight, Washington time,
February 28, 1991. As soon as the change-seeking people of
Iraq realised that Saddam Hussein's regime was definitively
defeated, they rose up against it. The Shi'ites in the southern
region of Iraq and the Kurds in northern Iraq had already
been struggling for reform for several years. BBC World Service reported on March 4, 1991, that a major rebellion by the
Shi'ites was underway and that some units of the Iraqi forces
had joined the rebels. At the same time, the Kurds started to
fight for freedom from Iraq, with combat intensifying in subsequent days.
The Shi'ite rebels, in light of their affinity with Iran and
the Shi'ites in Lebanon, did not attract much sympathy from
the U.S. or other allies until their plight became extremely
intolerable in summer/autumn 1992. Some Western leaders
went out of their way to express their belief in the territorial
integrity and political independence of Iraq, even though the
Shi'ites did not threaten these. The real fear appeared to be
the possibility that if victorious the Shi'ites might or might not
establish, in Iraq, a fundamentalist regime similar to that in
Iran.
Sadly, an opportunity to effectively intervene was missed
in the first few weeks after the ceasefire. The U.S. and allies
watched the unequal battles fought by Iraqi Republic Guards
against Shi'ites in th~ south and Kurds in the north, hoping
that anti-Saddam forces would win in the end.

2. Many statesmen, politicians, intellectuals, commentators and journalists
took this indirect approach of persuasion. For instance, Lord Carrington, a former
British Foreign Secretary and past Secretary-General of NATO, took this approach
in an interview with BBC Radio Four, FM News (Feb. 27, 1991).
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However, as many military analysts observed, Saddam
Hussein still possessed sufficient superiority over the iUequipped and less organised rebelling pockets of population. It
took more than five weeks for the world to realise that hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing to Iran and Turkey were
not likely to return to an Iraq governed by victorious rebels instead, Saddam Hussein was intact and the remaining
Shi'ites and Kurds were in danger of extermination.
Since the stated objective of the Kurds was to obtain a
separate homeland (in negotiations scaled-down to regional
autonomy), the Iraqi soldiers fought against them with more
ferocity. In consequence, they were forced to flee in very large
numbers. Iraqi soldiers chased them and thousands of them
took refuge in the inhospitable peaks of the cold and barren
mountains on the Iraq-Turkey border. An equal number of
Kurds, if not more, took refuge in Iran. At the height of this
unfortunate exodus, approximately three million Iraqi Kurds
were in Turkey, Iran, and trapped in the Iraqi-Turkish mountains.
The Kurds did not suffer the same disadvantages as the
Shi'ites in attracting the sympathies of the Western statesmen
and citizens. In the middle of April, 1991, appalling television
pictures and media reports about the plight of Kurds reached
the West. On April 26, 1991, BBC World Service quoted an
U.N. senior officer in the area as reporting that up to 2000
Kurds were dying every day due to worsening conditions,
shortage of essential supplies, and lack of adequate shelter.
Opposition politicians, commentators and members of the public roundly criticised governments for being the silent spectators· of the brutal treatment meted out by the Saddam regime
to the Kurdish minority. By then the Western States had lost
the opportunity of seeing the removal of Saddam Hussein by
the Iraqi people; by then non-intervention in the domestic
affairs of Iraq had been indelibly engraved on countless public
tablets.
To neutralise the public outrage, the Western Coalition
States turned to other options. One uncontroversial option was
humanitarian assistance. This was provided with reasonable
promptitude and efficiency. The U.N. bodies were galvanised
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into action, most significantly the office of the U.N. Commissioner for Refugees. While this speed of action can favourably
be compared to the quick response to other similar calamities,
it did not rank as high as fighting wars. For example, in the
beginning of April, 1991, the U.N. Secretary General appealed
for £580 million for the Kurdish relief but despite the urgency
the U.N. only funded £100 million after 4 weeks. 3
The question arises: What could the world do legally? This
is a formidable question. The nations have been so far too
much concerned with their political, military, economic and
other nationalistic interests. Thus, again, as on an intolerably
high number of occasions, the welfare of the individual, "the
ultimate unit of all law"\ has been pushed down on the agenda of formulation of new rules of International Law.
There is a burgeoning branch of International Law dealing
with the declaration, preservation and protection of human
rights. In the limited ambit of this article, the applicability of
the present International Law to the Kurdish exodus and related issues can be assessed from three angles: 1. the 1948
Genocide Convention, 2. the Right of Self-Determination and 3.
Human Rights in General. Before these can be addressed, however, the underlying issue of intervention in the domestic affairs of Iraq must be analysed.

II. INTERVENTION IN STATE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS
Whatever may be the legal analysis of the situation, one
has to face the argument on behalf of Iraq that International
Law forbids any State to intervene in the domestic affairs of
another State. This is undoubtedly the case. The classical in-

3. The BBC U.N. Correspondent, in his report from New York, reported the
frustration expressed by some U.N. officials and said that member States could
not ask the Organisation to do certain things without providing it with the necessary resources. See "News Hour", BBC World Service, 1300 GMT (Apr. 27, 1991).
4. An expression widely used by one-time judge of the International Court of
Justice, Hersch Lauterpacht; see, e.g., I INTERNATIONAL LAw - BEING THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF HERSCH LAUTERPACHT 303 (Elihu Lauterpacht ed., 1970).
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ternational jurists were unwilling to make any concession to
the inviolability of the municipal domain of a State. 5 In consequence of awful abuses of human rights in the first 45 years of
this century, particularly in the nazi era, many jurists believed
and many States accepted that the human beings were the
ultimate subjects of International Law and gross violation of
these rights - including the right to life, liberty, culture, religion and self-determination - was a legitimate and active concern of International Law. This, however, has not gained universal acceptance. As recently as April, 1991, Chinese Prime
Minister Li Peng denied the presence of any objective human
rights under International Law and said that China would
only be bound to subject its human rights record to the scrutiny of International Law to the extent it has obliged itself by
treaty obligations. He deemed it as an "interfer~nce with the
sovereignty of China" if the U.S. or any other State took any
action linked to the Chinese human rights record.
As far as the legitimating role of International Law, the
treaties and the U.N. resolutions pertaining to the protection
of human rights are functioning well. The civilised States adhere to them and support any verbal condemnation by institutional resolutions. In the context of the controlling role of International Law, these States are reluctant to give full teeth to
International Law of Human Rights. On some occasions, however, such as the UDI6 in Rhodesia and apartheid in South
Mrica, the usurpation of the majority rights has been punished
by economic sanctions.

Almost every State and many modem international jurists
are unwilling to go further than the penalty of economic sanctions. The reason behind this reluctance is too complex to be
thoroughly discussed in this article. A key view though, in the
eyes of the reconstructors of the post World War II regime and
the framers of the U.N. Charter, was that the supreme evil
was the "scourge of war". Hence, Article 2, para. 4 of the U.N.

5. This is abundantly clear from the writings of renowned international lawyers like Hyde, Moore, Hudson, Hackworth, Jessup, Oppenheim, Calvo and Tunkin.
Briggs, for instance, perceived the situation not very differently soon after World
War II. See THE LAw OF NATIONS 508-513 (Herbert W. Briggs ed., 2d ed. 1952).
6. Unilateral Declaration of Independence [of Southern Rhodesia].
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Charter obliged the member States "to refrain ... from the use
or threat of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence" of any member State. The object was to impose
a complete ban on war, other than in self-defence (Art. 51). To
ensure this complete embargo on war, the preexisting cornerstone principle of International Law of "exclusive domestic
jurisdiction" was applied even to the U.N .. Accordingly, Article
2, para. 7 forbids the U.N. from intervening in matters which
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state".7
Thus, the U.N. military enforcement is indubitably reserved
for ending a breach of peace, threat to peace or an act of aggression.
Some international lawyers narrowly interpret this prohibition and argue that human rights, inter alia, are not "essentially" within the domestic jurisdiction of a State; rather, they
are matters with which mankind as a whole is concerned.
Nevertheless, the concept of non-intervention remains a powerful obstruction to the enforcement of human rights.
,

III. BASES FOR PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS OF
THE KURDS

A. 1948 GENOCIDE CONVENTION
In consequence of persuasive writings about Hitlerism and
fascism, and the exposure of heinous war crimes of some individuals in the Nuremberg and other trials, the States were
enthusiastic and committed to prevent any recurrence of genocidal oppression by any future dictator. The Genocide Convention, after its draft was circulated for consultation and remarks
considered, was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on
December 9, 1948, in Paris. s Iraq, being a Contracting Party
to the Convention, has undertaken "to prevent and punish"
genocide which is a crime under international law "whether
committed in time of peace or time of war" (Art. I).
7. For analysis of this prohibition, see: D. P. O'CONNELL, I INTERNATIONAL
LAw 308-313 (1970).
8. GA Res. 260A, U.N. Doc. N810, at 174 (1948). On April 29, 1991, the
Convention was ratified by 106 States. For a thorough resume of this instrument,
see Matthew Lippman, The Drafting of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 3 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1-65 (1985).
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Thus, if genocide is proven, Iraq and other parties to the
Convention have an obligation to enforce the Convention. What
took place in relation to Kurds, in light of the present law,
however, cannot be prosecuted as the crime of "genocide". The
most appropriate provision under which genocide by the
Saddam regime may be established is Article II(c). It provides
that a State commits a crime of genocide when, "with intent to
destroy" it inflicts, upon "a national, ethnical, racial or religious group" such "conditions of life calculated to bring about
its physical destruction in whole or in part".
If the Kurds do not qualify as a "national" group since
they are scattered in substantial numbers in Iraq, Iran, and
Turkey, with some of their brethren living in Armenia and
Syria, there is still no difficulty in categorising them as an
"ethnical" or "racial" group. The difficulty lies in proving the
"intent" to destroy the group as such and the commensurate
actus reus. The U.S., which hesitated to ratify this Convention
until 1988, has insisted that this intent, as opposed to "basic"
or "generalised", must be a "specific intent".9 Furthermore, the
domestic courts of the parties to the Convention, as they
should be so authorised in compliance with Article V of the
Convention, can convict a member of the Saddam forces. The
alternative is to establish an ad hoc International Penal Court
envisaged by Article VI of the Genocide Convention. Many difficulties surround the use of this option. These range from
ascertaining proper venue and finding acceptable judges to
overcoming the hesistancy of nations, like the U.S., which have
historically not supported the concept of an international court
assuming any criminal jurisdiction. In any event, such a tribunal was not established to examine the human right crimes
against the Kurds in Iraq. In addition, in cases of either domestic or international adjudication, gathering reliable and
cogent evidence from a territory under the occupation of an
alleged perpetrator of the offence and from people on both
sides of the hatred line makes the whole exercise academic.

9. See Lawrence J. Leblanc, The Intent to Destroy Groups in the Genocide
Convention: The Proposed U.S. Understanding, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 369-385 (1984).
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B. SELF-DETERMINATION

The case for Self-Determination for Kurds is very weak.
According to several authors and the International Court of
Justice 1o, the U.N. General Assembly resolution 1514 of December 14, 1960 (passed by 89 States in favour, 9 abstentions
and none against) represents modern Customary International
Law. The resolution robustly enunciates the right of Self-Determination for peoples who are ethnically separate and occupy
a geographically distinct territory. The Kurds may be able to
prove that they are ethnically separate from the Arabs but
they cannot show that they occupy a "distinct" territory. They
are present in five different countries. Hence, they have virtually no chance of constructing a legal claim to Self-Determination. Even if they wish to achieve a political settlement, their
position is hopelessly weakened by the fact that one of the
States (Turkey) in which they live has great influence in contemporary times as a member of NATO.ll Any grant of independent homeland to the Kurds will be blocked by Turkey or
its allies as a dangerous precedent. Resistance to such an idea
will also come from other States like India where several sizeable minorities are demanding Self-Determination.
C. HUMAN RIGHTS IN GENERAL
Thus, neither the Genocide Convention nor the Right to
Self- Determination could have produced resolution of the
Kurdish problems. This indeed is shameful.
There is, however, another possible basis for protective
action. Over the years States have used the established principles of International Law of Human Rights to justify their
actions. Examples of Rhodesia and South Africa have already

10. See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Afri·
ca in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276
(1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 31; Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion,
1975 I.C.J. 12, 31-35. See also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 595-598 (4th ed. 1990).
11. See Robert McCorquodale, The World has a legal duty to protect Kurds,
INDEPENDENT, April 20, 1991 in which Prof. McCorquodale recognises these weakening aspects of the Kurdish case.
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been mentioned. Embargo on loans, transfer of technology, or
sale of weapons; withdrawal of "Most Favoured Nation" trading status; or breach or suspension of diplomatic relations have
been used to control a violator of human rights. In the Kurdish
case these measures were already in operation. The only option
to stop the violation by the Saddam regime of the internationally recognised, basic rights of the Kurds to life, liberty, home,
family, and culture was to intervene in the situation by the use
or threat of force.
Can this be done under International Law? The answer is
"yes". The "humanitarian intervention under International
Law" - as it is known to Hersch Lauterpacht and other international lawyers - even though more easily justified when
foreign citizens are being maltreated, can equally be undertaken "for the purpose of preventing a State from treating its own
nationals in a cruel and barbarous fashion."12 Sir Hartley
Shawcross, representing the United Kingdom at the U.N., saw
no legal impediment in undertaking an armed humanitarian
intervention to prevent gross abuses of human rights. He said
that where genocide was involved: "[H]umanitarian intervention by international law was even more definitely warranted.
Dictators should be warned that if they infringed upon human
rights, they acted on their own risk and that international law
would condemn them".13 International Law acknowledges the
primacy of domestic sovereigns but if they abuse it and take
themselves over the limits of law, they forfeit this right of
autonomy and become accountable to the authority of International Law.
It is a damning indictment of the community of States

that they have not produced an effective machinery to deal
with the illegalities of this serious kind. It appears that the
U.S., in common with other major States, has been less than
enthusiastic to establish a sound system of objective and disinterested machinery of verifying and punishing the human
12. See I INTERNATIONAL LAw - BEING THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF HERSCH
LAUTERPACHT, supra note 7. For a recent p~gressive approach, see W. Michael

Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84
AM. J. INT'L L. 866, 876 (1990).
13. U.N. GOAR 6th Comm., 1st Sess., 22nd mtg. at 101-2, U.N. Doc. AlC.6/84
(1946); See also Lippman, supra note 8, at 6.
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rights delicts. 14 It would seem that one explanation for this
stand is that those nations, such as the U.S. with superior
power and wealth, wish to retain maximum control of the
situation by dictating terms and gathering support to achieve a
particular result.
In this perspective, regarding the plight of the Kurds, the
Security Council could only pass resolution S/688 on April 5,
1991 - five weeks after the Kurdish uprising. Even though it
was one of the most advanced manifestations of U.N. action in
this field, the resolution still remains very weak. It represented a compromise amongst the U.N. members who genuinely
wished to do something for the Kurds - such as the U.K, albeit
in response to public pressure - and those who wished to avoid
establishing a precedent with which they could not live in the
future.
In resolution 688, the Security Council, "[m]indful of its
duties and its responsibilities under the Charter of the United
Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security" and "[r]ecalling Article 2, para. 7 of the Charter of the
United Nations", stated that it was "[g]ravely concerned by the
repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of
Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas
which led to a massive flow of refugees towards and across
international frontiers". It further stated that it was "[d]eeply
disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering involved".
To satisfy the supporters of Article 2, para. 7, the Security
Council in this resolution referred to letters of Turkey, France,
and Iran, thus thickening the international flavour of the issue. It mentioned that the repression lead to "cross border
incursions" which it deemed to "threaten international peace
and security in the region". The resolution condemned "the
repression of the Iraqi civilian population", demanded the
immediate end of this repression and insisted on immediate
access of international humanitarian assistance organisations
14. The U.S. signed the Genocide Convention just two days after its adoption
on December 9, 1948, but didn't ratify it until November 25, 1988, even then with
two reservations and five "understandings". For the reasons for this long delay by
the U.S., see Marian Nash Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 612, 622 (1986); Id. 79 AM. J.
INT'L L. 116, 131 (1985); and LeBlanc, supra note 11.
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to all those in need. Paragraphs 4-5 authorised the Secretary
General to provide humanitarian assistance and report back to
the Council.
This resolution would certainly have had a positive effect
on a civilised regime but the Saddam regime carried on its
brutal deeds - to some extent fueled by the military activities
of the Kurdish rebels. When public outrage intensified, the
British Prime Minister, Mr. John Major, put forward a plan of
"safe haven for the Kurds". The plan envisaged that some
territory in northern Iraq could be identified as a haven in
which Kurds could live unmolested by Iraqi soldiers. With the
support of the U.S. and other allies, the Iraqis were forced to
allow the units of the Coalition forces to establish a "safe zone"
to which the Kurdish refugees were encouraged to return.
Later the zone was further extended. The safe haven did induce many of the displaced Kurds to return to their homes
and, as of May 27, 1991, only about 200,000 Kurds were still
in Iran, Turkey and in mountains on the Iraqi-Turkish border.
On April 28, 1991, in a meeting with the British Foreign
Secretary, Mr. Douglas Hurd, other Foreign Ministers of the
EEC (the "European Union" since November 1, 1993) pledged
their support for the maintenance of the safety zone. Britain
and its friends at the U.N. sought a resolution by the Security
Council to give international legitimacy to the "safe haven"
concept, but they met stern resistance. The U.N. legal advisers
rejected it as being "ultra vires" the provisions of the Charter
and in particular in contravention of Article 2, para. 7. This
view was widely shared. For instance, Sir Anthony Parsons, a
former U.K Permanent Representative to the U.N., doubted
the legal basis of it and said that the Security Council had
already gone far enough under the Charter in passing resolution 688. However, this pragmatic concept is presently proving to be a great reliever of sufferings in Bosnia. It now appears to have gained legitimacy in the United Nations because
it is the only effective mechanism available in contemporary
International Law to prevent gross violations of human
rights. 15
15. In the Security Council Resolution 91811994, dated May 17, 1994, (to be
reprinted in U.N. Doc. S/ResJ918 (1994», the concept of "safe haven" has been
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In the Iraqi context, when the international community
was not willing to legitimate the idea of "safe haven", the allies
had no choice but to talk to the Iraqis. Of course, the militarily
defeated Iraqis were cooperative after negotiating and receiving strong diplomatic representations including, no doubt,
warnings of possible real consequences of non-compliance with
the wishes of the allies. Accordingly, with the Iraqi "consent"
(in the barest sense of that term) the "Allied Kurdistan Operation" had to carry on under the U.S. military command to create suitable conditions for the Kurds. After having established
themselves in the border town of Zakho, as a result of an
agreement with Iraql6, the allied units entered on May 24,
1991, the Iraqi city of Dohuk which is farther south and the
seat of a governette. One salient clause of this agreement was
the search for weapons of the Kurds returning to Dohuk at
certain check points manned by the Kurdish members of the
Iraqi police. The U.N. was also operating on the basis of Iraqi
consent and its negotiations produced an agreement with Iraq
which allowed it to send about 500 lightly armed guards selected from personnel generally guarding the U.N. offices allover
the world. 17 It was hoped that the security provided by the
allied and U.N. forces would send a signal of confidence about
the safety of the zone and the remaining 200,000 Kurds would
be persuaded to return from Iran, Turkey and the mountains
on the Iraqi-Turkish border. IS
The above discussion discloses that the principle of nonintervention in domestic jurisdiction triumphed over the coer-

accepted as a viable solution. The U.N. Secretary General advised the Security
Council: "[I]t is very urgent that, as called for in resolution 918(1994) secured
humanitarian areas be established [in Rwanda] where the estimated 2 million of
these unfortunate displaced persons can be provided with both security and assistance." U.N.S.C. Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Rwanda,
8/19941640 (May 31, 1994) (required by paragraphs 7 and 20 of S.C. Res. 91811994
to be submitted to the Security Council).
16. See THE TELEGRAPH, May 23, 1991, at 8.
17. See "News Desk" BBC World Service, midnight GMT (May 24, 1991).
18. The residual pockets of the Kurdish refugees were given sufficient sense of
security to return and by the end of August, 1991, virtually all of them returned
to their ancestral homes. However, when the Saddam forces realised that the
world had again pushed the Kurdish problem down the agenda, they launched a
military attack and, according to the BBC World Service, in November, 1991,
about 200,000 Kurds were coerced to flee to safe areas - the issue still appears to
be as complex as ever.
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cive enforcement against the gross violations of human rights
by a government of its own citizenry.
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this author would like to repeat the age-old
plea for the priority consideration of establishment of impartial organs to monitor and adjudicate the increasing and worsening violations of human rights. 20 This will minimise the
chances of abusive auto-interpretation of situations by powerful States which could find excuses to intervene by force in the
domestic jurisdiction of a country based on selfish and ulterior
motives. Until this is done, the majority of States will remain
apprehensive about subscribing to an effective machinery. In
this regard, the United States can playa significant role because it enjoys at this time the title of the only real superpower in the world. A glimpse of its policing capability was the
attack on the malevolent Bosnian Serb units on August 5,
1994, which could have not been contemplated without U.S.
support. The attack forced the Serbs to promptly promise to
return one tank, two armed personnel carriers and some other
ammunition, which they had brazenly removed from the U.N.
compound in Sarajevo a few days earlier.21
19

19. Jurists like Prof. Brierly were advocating, though with some peSSlmlsm,
international mechanisms to enforce human rights in the early life of the U.N ..
See II INTERNATIONAL LAw - BEING THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF HERSCH
LAUTERPACHT, supra note 4, at 448.
20. Paragraph 5 of the U.N. Secretary-General's Report (see supra note 14),
entitled "The Massacres in Rwanda", records an appalling story of atrocities. According to the Report, between 250,000 to 500,000 children, women and men out
of the 7 million Rwandan national population were killed in the previous 7 weeks.
[d.. In hypothetical, proportional terms this would be approximately the equivalent
to 9-18 million in the U.S .. [d. In light of this level of violence, the SecretaryGeneral in this Report states: "On the basis of the evidence that has emerged,
there can be little doubt that it constitutes genocide, since there have been large
scale killings of communities and families belonging to a particular ethnic group."
[d .. at para. 36. For further details of the unprecedented violations of human
rights in Rwanda, see also: Report of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human
Rights on his Mission to Rwanda, U.N. ESCOR, Commission on Human Rights,
3rd Special Sess., U.N. Doc. ElCN.4IS-313 (May 24-25, 1994) (hereinafter U.N.
Report on Rwanda).
21. In the aftermath of a totally inexcusable carnage of civilians in a busy
market square of Sarajevo on February 5, 1994, the U.N. Secretary-General by his
letter of February 6, 1994, informed the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(NATO) that the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) had established that at least
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By a dedicated effort aimed at boosting confidence in its
sincerity, backed by consonant deeds, the U.S. can convert the
global "tenuous consensus,,22 at the U.N. into a cohesive world
order that can effectively safeguard not only international
peace but also basic human rights. That it has to be done without wasting any time is amply clear from the U.N. SecretaryGeneral's lament about the outrageous human conditions in
Rwanda in 1994 stemming from civil war. He wrote:
The delay in reaction by the international community to the genocide in Rwanda has demonstrated graphically its extreme inadequacy to
respond urgently with prompt and decisive action to humanitarian crises, entwined with
armed conflict.... We all must recognise that in
this respect we have failed in our response to
the agony of Rwanda and, thus, have acquiesced
in the continued loss of human lives. Our readiness and capacity for action has been demonstrated to be inadequate at best and deplorable
at worst, owing to the absence of the collective
political will. The entire system requires review
to strengthen its reactive capacity.23

one of the mortar attacks on the shoppers in the market square on February 5,
1994, was the work of the Bosnian Serb forces. [Letter from the U.N. SecretaryGeneral, to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, (Feb. 6, 1994)]. "This made it
necessary to prepare urgently for the use of air attacks to deter further attacks of
this kind", wrote the U.N. Secretary General. Id.. Acting on the request of the
U.N. Secretary-General, the NATO Council in a meeting in Brussels on February
9, 1994, gave authorisation to launch air strikes, at the request of the U.N.,
against artillery or mortar positions on or around Sarajevo which were determined
by the UNPROFOR to be responsible for attacks against civilian targets in that
city. U.N. News Summary, NSl4I1994, (Feb. 10, 1994).
22. See D. W. Greig, "Self Defence And The Security Council: What Does Article 51 Require?", 40 1NT'L & COMPo L.Q. 366, 390 (1991).
23. See U.N. Report on Rwanda, supra note 32, at pars. 43.
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